Organized crime: On illegal markets, and Gambetta's conclusions

First, with regard to illegal business: this is a place where Gambetta's distinction between organized crime in general (a group of forces joined together to engage in illegal activity, see 227) and mafias in particular (illegal organizations providing private protection to people engaged in both legal and illegal activity) is especially important. They are distinct groups in a relationship with one another. Mafias play a role in the regulation and “licensing” of organized crime. To conflate the two activities would be a mistake. However, there is a complicating factor: what Gambetta calls “the mafia's tendency to internalize key customers by turning them into members” (227). This might be thought of as a way of maximizing profit or enhancing regulation, or it might be thought of as additional protection for criminal activity, in the form of deterrence of law enforcement.

The strongest motivation for people involved in illegal activity to seek private protection: they cannot get protection any other way (this is underlined by the foolishness of the young person in Orem, UT who reported the theft of his marijuana to the police: reported by UPI here). The second strongest motivation has to do with the need for regulation of competition and the avoidance of violence.

There is another factor as well, having to do with both the potentially high profits to be gained from illegal business and the correspondingly high levels of risk: it is difficult for people wanting to set out in an illegal enterprise to get access to capital (230-231). Smuggling, drugs processing, and similar activities can be very lucrative, but they require a large capital outlay and banks, for obvious reasons, are not likely to finance them. Enter the mafia. This means that mafias agree not only to do the work of protection, but risk their credibility and resources as well. A consequence of this: there is a strong motivation for mafia groups to form partnerships with people involved in illegal trade. A further consequence of this is that the type of “regulation” involved is likely to take the form of a monopoly (232).

This behavior is a result of the very high level of risk involved at all steps of the process. To take the example of the narcotics trade, 1) it is complex, involving a web of suppliers, transporters, processors, intermediaries, and distributors in a loose network that spans the world; 2) there is a high level of instability at all steps of the process; 3) the expense involved is large; 4) there are no guarantees of quality; 4) the level of distrust among actors in the market is extremely high; 5) the risk of theft or deception is extremely high; and 6) the exposure to law enforcement is potentially very high. One of the reasons that much of the violence that we know about involves this type of trade is that violence occurs when arrangements go wrong. There are a lot of things that can and do go wrong in this type of business.

A “solution” that probably adds to the danger of violence in the drugs market: mafia groups will generally not “protect” a complete operation from beginning to end, but will instead “protect” one particular element, bringing several (possibly competing) groups into a single transaction (239). The potential for internal disputes to emerge is very high. This also contributes to the risk of discovery and prosecution (244).

GAMBETTA'S CONCLUSIONS:

1) The mafia “brand name” is an invaluable asset, enhancing reputation and contributing to mystique. This asset is carefully maintained, which helps to explain how there can be high degrees of both cooperation and conflict within the Mafia (245).

2) The degree of “high-level” coordination is low, and this coordination is inconsistent and weak. Effective everyday control rests with the individual “family,” of which there are many (245-246).

3) There are basic consistencies over time in terms of the size and membership of mafia groups, the bases of recruitment, and what might be thought of as “codes of behavor” (246-248).

4) One of the resources on which the Mafia draws for its survival is popular support (or at least toleration), which can be attributed partly to the fact that it supplies a resource which is widely regarded as useful and necessary (248).

5) It is possible to identify basic conditions which account for the emergence of mafias: distrust, labor supply, weak government, the emergence of new and unprotected forms of property. These conditions are by no means unique to Sicily (252-254).

Gambetta also has some predictions: in particular, it seems to him that there is a tendency for mafia organization to become more centralized, and he interprets this as a sign of weakness (254-255). It is possible (but not certain) that the large-scale prosecutions in the 1980s and 1990s had a major impact on the mafia, and also possible (but not certain) that institutions whose symbolic acceptance of mafia activity (such as the Church) may be backing off (255-256). Whether these apparent signs of decline lead to major, meaningful decline depends on some factors that remain uncertain, such as whether the institutions of government will be able to successfully provide the protection which the mafia has been providing.